Whether individuals vote strategically is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. Exploiting a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may gain seats by receiving fewer votes, this paper documents patterns of strategic voting in a large, real world election. During the 2005 elections to the Bundestag, the sudden death of a right-wing candidate necessitated a by-election in one electoral district. Knowing the results in all other districts and aware of the paradoxical incentives in place, a substantial fraction of the electorate reacted tactically and either voted for a party other than their most preferred one, or abstained. As a result, the Christian Democratic Union won an additional mandate, extending its narrow lead over the Social Democrats.
I. Introduction
Elections are the cornerstone of democracy. But social choice theory has shown almost all voting systems to be susceptible to systematic manipulation (Arrow 1951 , Gibbard 1973 , Satterthwaite 1975 . That is, voters may have an incentive to misrepresent their true preferences in order to affect the outcome of an election. Although tactical voting is individually rational, it may be socially undesirable, as it precludes the proper aggregation of preferences, and can thereby lead to inferior allocations.
Thus, whether individuals cast strategic ballots to avoid 'wasting their vote' (Duverger 1954 , Downs 1957 ) is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. While strategic voting is well understood in theory , Cox 1994 , Carroll 2011 , the unobservability of preferences has made it very difficult to document tactical behavior empirically-despite substantial anecdotal evidence. 1 In fact, in an important paper Degan and Merlo (2009) prove that, given commonly available cross-sectional data, it is impossible to identify strategic voting without imposing restrictions on voters'
preferences.
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It may therefore not be surprising that the existing literature draws mixed conclusions.
While Coate et al. (2008) reject the pivotal-voter model, Cox (1997) presents a swath of evidence broadly consistent with strategic behavior in different electoral systems. More recently, Kawai and Watanabe (2010) estimate a structural model of preferences and voting decisions, from which they infer that between 75% and 80% of voters act strategically. In stark contrast, relying on survey responses about preferences, expectations, and votes, a large number of earlier studies argue that the prevalence of instrumentally rational voting is actually very lowestimates typically range from 3% to 17% (e.g., Blais et al. 2001 , Niemi et al. 1993 , and Abramson et al. 1992 ; see Alvarez and Nagler 2000 for a discussion of various problems associated with the survey approach).
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Instead of taking survey responses at face value or making assumptions about voters' underlying preferences, this paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence from a natural experiment. The empirical strategy relies on a geographically localized, temporary reversal of incentives due to a flaw in the German electoral system by which a party may actually gain seats if it receives fewer votes. Using multiple years of election data and comparing the behavior of affected voters with that of unaffected ones (exploiting both geographic variation and variation over time), identification in this paper is not subject to Degan and Merlo's (2009) impossibility result.
Eleven days before the 2005 elections to the Bundestag the candidate (Direktkandidat) of the far right-wing National Democratic Party (NPD) in Electoral District 160 (Dresden I) passed away unexpectedly. Although she had virtually no chance of being elected, electoral law required a by-election. But in contrast to prior cases, her death occurred too close to election day for the by-election to be held on the originally scheduled date. Consequently, almost 220,000 eligible voters in Saxony's District 160 were given the opportunity to cast their ballots two weeks after everybody else, and after the Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahllleiter) had announced the preliminary results of the election. 4 Based on these results the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), would win 225 seats in the Bundestag, whereas the rival Social Democratic Party (SPD) would only receive 222. Under ordinary circumstances, one would hardly expect less than .5% of the electorate to influence the outcome of an election, especially not when the allocation of seats is approximately proportional to the number of votes.
Yet, in 2005 a few hundred votes could make the difference between a 2-, 3-, or even 4-seat lead for the CDU/CSU.
Although the German electoral system aims for proportional representation of all parties clearing a 5%-threshold, determining a party's exact number of seats is substantially more complicated. The crucial point is that voters cast two different votes-a list vote and a candidate vote-and that due to rounding a party may lose a seat in the legislature by obtaining "too many" list votes in states in which it won the plurality of the candidate vote in sufficiently many districts (see Section II for a detailed explanation). In 2005 exactly this situation occurred. Figure 1 illustrates the paradoxical incentives in place during the by-election. If the CDU were to win more than approximately 41,000 list votes in Saxony's District 160-it had received 49,638 in the 2002 election-then it would lose a seat in the Bundestag. On the other hand, it might even increase its seat total by one if it garnered few list votes, but the plurality of the candidate vote.
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Critically, since the by-election was conducted almost two weeks after the preliminary results had been announced, the electorate in District 160 was potentially aware of the peculiar circumstances before going to the polls. 6 In fact, due to the closeness of the national race between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, the by-election received intense media coverage with pundits lamenting the perverse incentives. Consequently, if voters acted strategically, one would expect the following: (i) The CDU should garner fewer list votes in the by-election than under ordinary circumstances, but (ii) it should receive a larger share of the candidate vote.
7
In the end, the CDU did win the plurality of the candidate vote, while receiving "only" 38,208 list votes. It was, therefore, able to extend its narrow lead over the SPD. A priori, however, is not clear whether this would have happened even in the absence of the by-election, or whether (parts of) the electorate did vote strategically.
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The empirical evidence presented in this paper points clearly toward strategic voting. For instance, the upper panel in Table 1 Using hitherto unavailable official election data on the sub-district level, the main result of this paper establishes that the disparities documented in Table 1 are quite robust (even to the inclusion of district specific trends) and unlikely to be due to chance. Moreover, exploiting the different incentive structure associated with candidate and list votes, the evidence presented below indicates that supporters of the rival SPD voted for the CDU (in an attempt to hurt it), whereas adherents of the latter either abstained or substituted toward the libertarian Free Democratic Party (FDP)-the CDU's traditional coalition partner.
Although the by-election was a highly unusual event and not all voters might have even been aware of their optimal strategy, the point estimates in this paper indicate that at least 12% of all eligible voters in District 160 reacted strategically when faced with the new incentive structure. Hence, this paper identifies (under relatively weak assumptions) a lower bound on the share of strategic voters that is at least as large as, or even larger, than most findings in the previous literature.
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides background information on the electoral system used in Germany's elections to the Bundestag, as well as further details on the natural experiment. Section III describes the data, and Section IV contains the empirical results. The last section concludes. A Data Appendix with the precise definitions and sources of all variables is also provided.
II. Germany's Electoral System and the Case of District 160
Elections of representatives to the Federal Diet of Germany (Bundestag) are held according to a mixed member system with approximately proportional representation. Except for minor modifications, the same system has been in place since 1957 (see Bawn 1993 for an account of its genesis Approximately proportional representation is achieved by deducting direct mandates from the number of mandates to which parties are entitled based on the list vote, i.e. their list mandates.
Deviations from strict proportionality are due to three factors: the 5%-threshold, rounding, and overhang mandates (Überhangmandate). The latter are a peculiarity of the German system that arises if in some state a party wins more direct mandates than seats under proportional representation. In such cases, the total number of seats in the Bundestag is raised and said party gets to keep all direct mandates without losing seats in other states.
More formally, let ! !,! denote the number of direct mandates accruing to party ! in state !.
! !,! is the number of list votes that ! received in !, with the equivalent number on the national
With this notation in hand, party !'s seat total is calculated in three steps:
Step 1: Proportional Allocation of List Mandates to Parties. Absent overhang mandates, there are 598 seats in the Bundestag. These are allocated by proportionality rule to the set of parties clearing the 5%-threshold or winning at least three direct mandates. That is, the number of list mandates of party ! equals 11 In describing the German electoral system this section borrows from Korte (2010) . 12 A party list is a pre-determined ranking of candidates based on which list mandates are awarded. By law parties must post different lists in each state, and a candidate can appear on only one list ( §27 BWG).
and ≅ represents equality after rounding according to the method of Hare-Niemeyer. 13 Also known the 'largest remainder method', HareNiemeyer first assigns each party a number of seats equal to the integer part of
. The parties with the largest remainders are then allocated one additional list mandate until all available seats have been distributed. This ensures that
Step 
where ≅ is defined as above.
Step 3: Determination of the Actual Number of Seats. The actual number of seats that party ! receives in state ! is given by
If ! !,! < ! !,! then, in addition to the district winners, the first ! !,! − ! !,! candidates on !'s list in ! are elected to the Bundestag as well. Otherwise, only holders of direct mandates receive a seat.
Note that unless a party can secure overhang mandates, i.e. unless ! !,! > ! !,! for some !, its 14 Importantly for the purposes of this paper, there also exist scenarios in which a party loses a seat by gaining list votes. To see this consider a small increase in ! !,! , not large enough to affect
Although the total number of !'s list mandates does not change, even a small gain in ! !,! may 13 In 2009 the Sainte-Laguë method was used instead. 14 Generally they accrue only to the two major factions, i.e. the CDU/CSU or the SPD.
be enough for ! ! × ! !,! ! ! in equation (1) to be rounded upward instead of downward. But for
to continue to hold, an increase in ! !,! must result in a corresponding reduction in
, then according to (2) that small increase in votes would actually lower party !'s seat total. In words, a small gain in the number of list votes may lead to the reassignment of a list mandate from a state in which a party won few direct mandates to one in which it secured more direct mandates than seats under proportional representation. But since the actual number of seats it receives in any state equals the maximum of direct and list mandates (cf.
Step 3), reallocating a list mandate from one state to another may lead to a lower seat total.
In general, the occurrence of such a situation is very difficult to predict in advanceprimarily because the inherent uncertainty in ! !,! makes rounding in (1) almost impossible to
anticipate. This was not the case, however, leading up the 2005 elections in District 160.
B. The Case of District 160
On September 5, 2005, Kerstin Lorenz, running as the National Democratic Party's (NPD) direct candidate in Electoral District 160 (Dresden I), suffered a stroke during a campaign event. As a result of the stroke she passed away on September 7-eleven days before the elections to the Bundestag.
German electoral law requires a by-election whenever a direct candidate dies prior to election day (cf. §43 BWG and §82 BWO). In similar instances by-elections were usually held on election day itself. But in the case of District 160, Lorenz's death occurred too close to the originally scheduled date for the NPD to be given sufficient time to nominate another candidate, and for new ballots to be printed. Thus, the electorate in District 160 was asked to go to the polls mandates. Thus, prior to the by-election in District 160 the CDU/CSU had a narrow 3-seat lead over the SPD, making it the largest faction.
16 Table 2 displays the preliminary result (excluding District 160), as well as the calculations used to determine the CDU's seat total. Based on these results and past outcomes in District 160, no party could hope to win an additional list mandate on the national level (cf.
Step 1). Focusing on the second step, however, it is straightforward to verify that the CDU found itself in the perverse situation described above.
Should, say, 42,000 voters cast their list votes for the CDU, then it would receive 11 instead of 10 list mandates in Saxony, and 46 instead of 47 in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia. But given the number of direct mandates it had already won in these states, receiving "too many" list votes in the by-election would actually cost the CDU a seat in the Bundestag (cf.
Step 3).
However, if it received fewer than 41,000 list votes, then the number of list mandates in the state of Saxony would remain at 10 (and potentially increase from 2 to 3 in the Saarland offset by a corresponding reduction in North Rhine-Westphalia). Thus, by winning the direct mandate in District 160 while not receiving "too many" list votes, the CDU/CSU faction could even gain a seat (cf. Figure 1 ).
Due to the closeness of the national race, the by-election received a lot of attention from the media. Although coverage focused mostly on the competition for the outstanding direct mandate, a number of pundits also commented on the perverse incentives associated with the list vote.
Moreover, parties adapted their campaign strategies. Besides having volunteers reach out to the electorate in order to explain the unusual situation, the CDU posted banners promoting its direct candidate ("Erststimme für Andreas Lämmel"). The SPD contender used an interview with the local newspaper to ask supporters of the Green Party, whose nominee had virtually no chance of being elected, for their support (Sächsische Zeitung 2005a). Interestingly, despite the fact that the FDP could not gain an additional seat in the Bundestag, it printed more than 1,000 new posters prompting voters to cast their first vote for the CDU candidate and their second vote for the FDP (see Figure 2 ). Although the FDP is the CDU's traditional coalition partner, it is generally rare for a party to spend resources and explicitly campaign for another candidate.
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The columns on the right of Table 2 show the final result. In the end, the CDU received "only" 38,208 list votes, and won the plurality of the candidate vote. 18 Therefore, it ended up gaining one seat.
Given the intense media coverage and parties' campaign efforts, it seems reasonable to assume that a non-trivial fraction of voters were aware of the reversed incentives. But since a single vote has almost no chance of being decisive, it is not clear whether individual voters would indeed react strategically, or whether the CDU would have won the additional seat even under ordinary circumstances.
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III. Data Sources and Summary Statistics
In order to answer this question, the present paper relies on data from several sources. The Information on demographic as well as socio-economic characteristics of districts is provided by Bundeswahlleiter (2002b Bundeswahlleiter ( , 2005d Bundeswahlleiter ( , 2009b . These publications rely on official numbers from the Federal Statistical Office, aggregated to the level of the electoral district.
Unfortunately, there exists no comparable information on polling precincts.
Differentiating between District 160 and Saxony's other districts, Table 3 presents summary statistics for all variables used throughout the analysis. Not surprisingly, given that District 160
consists of the southern parts of the city of Dresden, there exist important differences. Not only is District 160 substantially more urban, but in contrast to other districts its population is actually growing. Moreover, residents of District 160 are less likely to work in manufacturing, and experience lower rates unemployment-although unemployment is still a major problem. In terms of election results, the CDU receives on average somewhat lower vote shares in District 160, whereas the SPD and the Green Party fare slightly worse in the remainder of Saxony.
Although differences in political preferences appear to be less stark than those in socioeconomic characteristics, District 160 is clearly not perfectly representative. It is, therefore, important to account for district specific idiosyncrasies in determining the electorate's reaction to the paradoxical incentives it faced during the by-election.
IV. Evidence of Strategic Voting
A. Econometric Approach
The empirical approach in this paper mirrors a classical difference-in-differences (DD) strategy;
with District 160 being "treated" and all other districts in the state of Saxony serving as the "control group". 21 The only important difference is that there are three instead of the usual two and there do not exist data on the sub-precinct level, it is not possible to link precincts over time. 21 Districts in the same state are likely subject to similar overall trends and may thus be a better comparison group than districts in East Germany as a whole, or even West Germany. The robustness checks in Table 6 show that the main results are qualitatively robust to the choice of control group.
pre-and post-treatment periods, respectively. The key identifying assumption, however, is the same as that in the standard DD approach: In the absence of treatment, i.e. without a by-election, District 160 would have followed the same path as districts in the comparison group.
Although this assumption is not directly testable, one might be willing to judge its reasonability by comparing outcomes in the pre-and post-treatment periods. To this end, consider the upper panel in Figure 4 . To quantify the deviations more precisely, consider the following econometric specification: the left to the right within each group of regressions, the set of included fixed effects steadily grows. The last column within each group even controls for district specific linear trends.
B. Empirical Results
As one would expect, point estimates based on district and precinct level data align quite closely, but the latter are estimated more precisely. 23 More importantly, estimates controlling for year as well as district fixed effects differ very little from those that also account for trends. This suggests that different trends cannot explain the patterns shown graphically in Figure 4 .
Quantitatively, ! is estimated to be fairly large. For instance, in the absence of the byelection the CDU is predicted to have garnered about 4.9% less of the candidate vote, but an additional 3.6% of the list vote. Under most reasonable assumptions on turnout, the latter would have resulted in substantially more than 41,000 list votes; and, therefore, cost the CDU a seat in parliament.
The last set of regressions uses the difference in the CDU's share of the candidate and list vote as dependent variable. It pursues a triple-differencing strategy to isolate the effect of the byelection and its unusual incentive structure. Note that even if there was an unobserved shock specific to District 160 and the 2005 election, as long as it did not have a differential impact on voters' perceptions of the CDU's direct candidate and the CDU as a whole, the estimates reported in columns (9)- (12) and (21)- (24) would still be consistent.
Therefore, it may be comforting to know that the triple-difference estimate of ! continues to be large, i.e. about 8.5 percentage points, and is very similar to what one would expect based on its difference-in-difference components in the columns to the left. Moreover, the precision of the estimates makes it quite unlikely that the results in Table 4 are due to chance. It appears much more plausible that at least some voters in District 160 internalized the incentives and cast strategic ballots. Table 5 exploits the sub-district nature of the data, and presents additional evidence in favor of this assertion. Columns (1) and (2), for instance, explore the effect on turnout. 24 If the electorate was, indeed, aware of the peculiar incentives and reacted rationally, there should have been lower turnout in the by-election-after all the distribution of seats had for the most part been already determined.
In line with this prediction, overall turnout is estimated to be 4.8 percentage points lower.
Interestingly, the additional interaction term in column (2) hints at a larger effect for CDU partisans. To see this, note that voters who wish the CDU to gain an additional mandate, should never cast their candidate vote for the rival SPD. Thus, the share of a precinct's candidate vote accruing to the SPD can be interpreted as a proxy for the fraction of voters that do not support the CDU. By this measure, turnout is estimated to be higher among voters who view the CDU unfavorably. Given that CDU supporters could potentially cost their most preferred party a seat by voting for it, whereas supporters of other parties couldn't influence their parties' seat totals, it may not be entirely surprising that turnout is estimated to have been lower among the former.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 demonstrate that the FDP, the CDU's traditional coalition partner, benefited from the by-election. Taking the coefficient in (3) at face value, the FDP received an additional 7% of the list vote. By a similar argument as above, column (4) shows that this gain was much lower, even negative, in precincts more critical of the CDU. This suggests that CDU partisans who did go to the polls voted strategically by casting their list vote for the FDP.
If supporters of the SPD (and potentially those of other parties as well) fully grasped the situation and behaved tactically, then one might even expect them to attempt to hurt the CDU by voting for it. While in regular election years there is a very strong negative correlation between a precinct's SPD share of the candidate vote and its CDU share of the list vote, the positive interaction term in column (6) indicates that this relationship was much weaker during the 2005 elections in District 160. Furthermore, column (8) demonstrates that the usual near one-to-one correspondence between the CDU's list and candidate vote shares does not hold in the byelection. The evidence, therefore, suggests that CDU supporters substituted toward the FDP and other parties' followers attempted to hurt the CDU by voting for it. 24 The number of observations in columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 is lower than in the remaining columns because turnout cannot be calculated for precincts which handle only absentee ballots. Absentee voters are included in the turnout figure of the precinct in which they reside.
Lastly, the results shown in columns (9) and (10) indicate that the SPD received a higher than usual fraction of the by-election's candidate vote. Since the Green Party's own candidate had essentially no chance of winning the direct mandate, and given that the Green Party is much closer in policy space to the SPD than the CDU, strategic Green Party supporters should choose the SPD candidate with their first vote. Although the interaction term in (10) is not statistically significant, it appears that at least some of the additional SPD voters were adherents of the Green Party. While this particular piece of evidence is not very strong, it is nevertheless consistent with tactical voting behavior.
C. Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis
Broadly summarizing, the results presented above indicate that parts of the electorate reacted rationally to the perverse incentives in the by-election. Supporters of the CDU either abstained or cast their list vote for the FDP, whereas adherents of the rival SPD appear to have voted for the CDU. This subsection explores the sensitivity and robustness of these results.
To this end the upper panel in Table 6 probes the sensitivity of ! with respect to different specifications. For comparison the first row displays the baseline results, i.e. those from columns
(1), (3), (5), (7), and (9) in Table 5 . Successive rows vary the weighting scheme, the set of included controls, as well as the control group. The last row estimates the baseline model using vote shares calculated as the percentage of all eligible voters. Since turnout is itself affected by the reversal of incentives and the distribution of seats depends on the number of list votes, these estimates may be more informative for answering certain questions than ones based on ordinary vote shares.
Although individual point estimates do, of course, vary, ! is qualitatively quite robust.
Neither different covariates, nor changing the control group seem to have much influence on the conclusions drawn in this paper.
At first glance there would seem to be two exceptions, however. The CDU's share of the candidate vote actually decreases when calculated as the percentage of all eligible voters; and the SPD's gain is estimated to be much smaller than at baseline. Given that turnout is itself endogenous this may not be entirely surprising. If supporters of all parties were more likely to abstain than in ordinary years, but adherents of the CDU did so disproportionally, then this alone may explain the differences.
The lower panel in Table 6 performs robustness checks on the additional interaction terms included in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) of Table 5 . Again, the first row shows the baseline results; and as was the case for the main effects, the estimates appear to be very robust.
V. Concluding Remarks
Whether, and if so to what extent, individuals cast strategic votes is one of the most important questions at the intersection of economics and political science. This paper provides empirical evidence from a natural experiment in which a party benefited by receiving fewer votes.
Comparing the behavior of constituencies facing different incentives, identification in this paper is not subject to the impossibility result by Degan and Merlo (2009) .
The evidence presented above points clearly toward a non-trivial incidence of strategic voting, despite the fact that the by-election could at most have had a very small effect on the overall distribution of seats.
Taking the estimates at face value, one can derive a lower bound on the fraction of strategic agents. To do so add the change in the FDP's share of the list vote, the change in the SPD's share of the candidate vote (both calculated as percentage of all eligible voters, cf. 26 One may also derive on upper bound on the share of strategic voters, although it is unlikely to be tight. To do so note that individuals voting for the direct candidates of the FDP, Green Party, The Left, or the NPD cannot have cast strategic ballots, since these candidates were known to have had virtually no chance of winning the district, or being tied for first (see, for instance, the representative poll published nine days before the by-election in the Sächsische
Data Appendix to "Strategic Voting: Evidence from a Natural Experiment"
This appendix provides a description of all data used in the paper as well as precise definitions together with the exact sources of all variables. Others' Share of List Vote is defined as the portion of all valid list votes (in %) that are not cast for the parties listed above.
A. Precinct Level Variables
B. District Level Variables
Information on demographic and socio-economic characteristics of districts has been taken from Population is defined as the number of individuals of all ages (in 1,000) that reside within the district.
Population Density is defined as a district's number of residents over its geographic area (in km 2 ).
Population Growth is defined as the yearly change in the number of residents (from all sources) per 1,000 residents.
Number of Cars is defined as the number of officially registered cars per 1,000 residents.
Percent of Labor Force in
Manufacturing is defined as the share of all workers subject to social insurance contributions that work in manufacturing.
Percent of Labor Force in Service
Industry is defined as the share of all workers subject to social insurance contributions that work in commerce and sales, telecommunications, or other service jobs.
Unemployment Rate is defined as the number of all officially registered unemployed individuals over the sum of the gainfully employed and those registered as unemployed. For each year this number corresponds to the published official unemployment rate.
C. Mapping Polling Precincts into Electoral Districts
As mentioned in the main text, the state of Saxony contained 17 electoral districts in 2002 and
2005, but only 16 in 2009. This necessitates the construction of a consistent mapping from Saxony's polling precincts into districts, on which the main results can be based. In constructing this mapping the paper relies on municipality identifiers contained in the raw data as well as the appendices to the Bundeswahlgesetz, which list all municipalities in any given district. 2005 serves as the base year. In a very small number of instances absentee precincts are associated with multiple municipalities which (in another election year) belonged to different electoral districts. In such cases the absentee precinct is allocated to the district that contains the greater municipality. In the robustness checks in Table 6 this paper also uses other districts in East and
West Germany as a comparison group. Since migration led to the redrawing of districts in a number of instances, a second mapping had to be constructed. This mapping assigns a unique identifier to all districts in 2002. If a district remained unchanged over the course of [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] 4 then the same identifier is also used in subsequent years. In cases in which borders were redrawn a new (unique) identifier is assigned to the resulting district. Bundeswahlleiter (2002a Bundeswahlleiter ( , 2005a Bundeswahlleiter ( , 2009a Notes: Entries in the upper panel are coefficients and standard errors on δ, obtained by estimating equation (3) using least squares. Entries in the lower panel correspond to the additional interaction terms added in columns (2), (4), (6), (8), and (10) in Table 5 . The respective dependent variables are listed at the top of each column, and the relevant sample restriction or change in the set of controls is denoted on the left of each row. All specifications include year fixed effects, district fixed effects, district specific linear trends, and, if applicable, indicator variables for missing covariates. See the Data Appendix for the precise definitions and sources of all variables.
